Screening peers softly: Inferring the quality of small borrowers

Management Science

Volumn 62, Issue 6, 2016, Pages 1554-1577

  Iyer, Rajkamal ^a   Khwaja, Asim Ijaz ^b,c   Luttmer, Erzo F P ^c,d   Shue, Kelly ^c,e  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^d DARTMOUTH COLLEGE   (United States)

^e UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Crowd sourcing; Market inference; Market based lending; Peer to peer credit markets; Screening

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; SCREENING;

CREDIT MARKETS; CREDIT SCORES; FINANCIAL INFORMATION; PREDICTIVE POWER;

FINANCE;

EID: 84975144623     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2015.2181     Document Type: Article

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