Information aggregation and manipulation in an experimental market

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 60, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 449-459

  Hanson, Robin ^a   Oprea, Ryan ^a   Porter, David ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746320529     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.09.011     Document Type: Article

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