Les théories de la firme entre « contrats » Et « compétences » Une revue critique des développements contemporains

Revue d'Economie Industrielle

Volumn 129-130, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 57-86

  Coriat, Benjamin ^a   Weinstein, Olivier ^a  

^a CNRS   (France)

Author keywords

Agency costs; Competencies; Contract; Firm; Routines; Transaction costs

Indexed keywords

EID: 84975144419     PISSN: 01543229     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.4000/rei.4142     Document Type: Review

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