Countervailing incentives in value-based payment

Healthcare

Volumn 5, Issue 3, 2017, Pages 125-128

  Arnold, Daniel R ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS; CARDIAC SURGEON; CORONARY ARTERY BYPASS GRAFT; DECISION MAKING; DOCTOR PATIENT RELATION; ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD; ENDOWMENT EFFECT; FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT; GOVERNMENT; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HEALTH CARE QUALITY; HEALTH SERVICE; HUMAN; MEDICARE; MOTIVATION; ORGAN DONOR; PAY FOR PERFORMANCE; PHYSICIAN ATTITUDE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; REVIEW; UNITED STATES; VACCINATION; MEDICAL FEE; PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT; PHYSICIAN; PSYCHOLOGY; STANDARDS; TRENDS;

ECONOMICS, BEHAVIORAL; FEE-FOR-SERVICE PLANS; HUMANS; MOTIVATION; PHYSICIAN INCENTIVE PLANS; PHYSICIANS;

EID: 84971216457     PISSN: 22130764     EISSN: 22130772     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.hjdsi.2016.04.009     Document Type: Review

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