Pure and mixed strategies for programmed trading in a periodic double auction

International Journal of Applied Decision Sciences

Volumn 1, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 338-358

  Thavikulwat, Precha ^a   Pillutla, Sharma ^a  

^a TOWSON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

cellular connection services; clearinghouse; electricity; equilibrium; market efficiency; mixed strategy; periodic double auction; price; programmed trading; shuffling algorithm

Indexed keywords

EID: 84969451584     PISSN: 17558077     EISSN: 17558085     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1504/IJADS.2008.021227     Document Type: Article

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