Competition and cooperation in divisible good auctions: An experimental examination

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 195-235

  Sade, Orly ^a   Schnitzlein, Charles ^b   Zender, Jaime F ^c,d  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 29344458576     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhj005     Document Type: Review

References (23)

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