A double auction market: Teaching, experiment, and theory

Simulation and Gaming

Volumn 36, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 166-182

  Shubik, Martin ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Allocation games; Double auctions; Experimental games; Noncooperative equilibria

Indexed keywords

EID: 21044457673     PISSN: 10468781     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1046878105277536     Document Type: Article

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