Effective Teacher Retention Bonuses: Evidence From Tennessee

Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis

Volumn 38, Issue 2, 2015, Pages 199-221

  Springer, Matthew G ^a,b   Swain, Walker A ^a,b   Rodriguez, Luis A ^a,b  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Tennessee Consortium on Research   (United States)

Author keywords

educational equity; financial incentives; teacher mobility; teacher retention

Indexed keywords

EID: 84966728777     PISSN: 01623737     EISSN: 19351062     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3102/0162373715609687     Document Type: Article

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