Boomerangs versus Javelins: How Polarization Constrains Communication on Climate Change

Environmental Politics

Volumn 25, Issue 5, 2016, Pages 788-811

  Zhou, Jack ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

backfire; climate change; framing; identity; motivated reasoning; Polarization

Indexed keywords

CLIMATE CHANGE; COMMUNICATION; ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS; PARTY POLITICS;

EID: 84964049097     PISSN: 09644016     EISSN: 17438934     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2016.1166602     Document Type: Article

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