What Cognitive Representations Support Primate Theory of Mind?

Trends in Cognitive Sciences

Volumn 20, Issue 5, 2016, Pages 375-382

  Martin, Alia ^a   Santos, Laurie R ^b  

^a VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON   (New Zealand)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

cognitive development; comparative cognition; infant cognition; mental states; nonhuman primates; social cognition; theory of mind

Indexed keywords

FORECASTING;

COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT; COMPARATIVE COGNITION; INFANT COGNITION; MENTAL STATE; NON-HUMAN PRIMATE; SOCIAL COGNITION; THEORY OF MINDS;

MAMMALS;

ADULT; AWARENESS; BEHAVIOR; CHILD; HUMAN; HUMAN VERSUS ANIMAL COMPARISON; MENTAL HEALTH; PERCEPTION; PREDICTION; PRIMATE; THEORY OF MIND; ANIMAL; COGNITION;

ANIMALS; AWARENESS; COGNITION; HUMANS; PRIMATES; THEORY OF MIND;

EID: 84961966559     PISSN: 13646613     EISSN: 1879307X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2016.03.005     Document Type: Review

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