A second look at automatic theory of mind: Reconsidering kovács, téglás, and endress (2010)

Psychological Science

Volumn 26, Issue 9, 2015, Pages 1353-1367

  Phillips, Jonathan ^a   Ong, Desmond C ^b   Surtees, Andrew D R ^c   Xin, Yijing ^d   Williams, Samantha ^d   Saxe, Rebecca ^d   Frank, Michael C ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^d MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Automaticity; False belief; Open data; Open materials; Replication; Theory of mind

Indexed keywords

FEMALE; HUMAN; MALE; PERCEPTION; THEORY OF MIND;

FEMALE; HUMANS; MALE; SOCIAL PERCEPTION; THEORY OF MIND;

EID: 84957536389     PISSN: 09567976     EISSN: 14679280     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0956797614558717     Document Type: Article

References (36)

1. Back, E., & Apperly, I. A. (2010). Two sources of evidence on the non-automaticity of true and false belief ascription. Cognition, 115, 54–70. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.11.008
2. Baron-Cohen, S. (1989). The autistic child’s theory of mind: A case of specific developmental delay. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 30, 285–297. doi:10.1111/j.1469-7610.1989.tb00241.x
3. Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”? Cognition, 21, 37–46. doi:10.1016/0010-02778590022-8
4. Barr, D. J., Levy, R., Scheepers, C., & Tily, H. J. (2013). Random effects structure for confirmatory hypothesis testing: Keep it maximal. Journal of Memory and Language, 68, 255–278. doi:10.1016/j.jml.2012.11.001
5. Bates, D., Maechler, M., & Bolker, B. (2012). lme4: Linear mixed-effects models using ‘Eigen’ and S4. Retrieved from http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=lme4
6. Bennett, J. (1978). Some remarks about concepts. Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 1, 557–560. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00076573
7. Borenstein, M., Hedges, L. V., Higgins, J., & Rothstein, H. R. (2010). A basic introduction to fixed-effect and randomeffects models for meta-analysis. Research Synthesis Methods, 1, 97–111.
8. Carlson, S. M., Moses, L. J., & Breton, C. (2002). How specific is the relation between executive function and theory of mind? Contributions of inhibitory control and working memory. Infant and Child Development, 11, 73–92. doi:10.1002/icd.298
9. Cohen, A. S., & German, T. C. (2009). Encoding of others’ beliefs without overt instruction. Cognition, 111, 356–363. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.03.004
10. Dennett, D. C. (1978). Beliefs about beliefs. Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 1, 568. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00076664
11. Frank, M. C., & Saxe, R. (2012). Teaching replication. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 600–604. doi:10.1177/1745691612460686
12. Gelman, A., & Hill, J. (2007). Data analysis using regression and multilevel/hierarchical models. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
13. Grice, H. P. (1989). Studies in the way of words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
14. Hala, S., Hug, S., & Henderson, A. (2003). Executive function and false-belief understanding in preschool children: Two tasks are harder than one. Journal of Cognition and Development, 4, 275–298. doi:10.1207/S15327647JCD040303
15. Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2004). Chimpanzees are more skilful in competitive than in cooperative cognitive tasks. Animal Behaviour, 68, 571–581. doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2003.11.011
16. Herman, L. M., & Kantowitz, B. H. (1970). The psychological refractory period effect: Only half the double-stimulation story? Psychological Bulletin, 73, 74–88. doi:10.1037/h0028357
17. Heyes, C. (2014). False belief in infancy: A fresh look. Developmental Science, 17, 647–659. doi:10.1111/desc.12148
18. Jaeger, T. F. (2008). Categorical data analysis: Away from ANOVAs (transformation or not) and towards logit mixed models. Journal of Memory and Language, 59, 434–446.
19. Keysar, B., Lin, S., & Barr, D. J. (2003). Limits on theory of mind use in adults. Cognition, 89, 25–41. doi:10.1016/S0010-02770300064-7
20. Knudsen, B., & Liszkowski, U. (2012). Eighteen- and 24-monthold infants correct others in anticipation of action mistakes. Developmental Science, 15, 113–122. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01098.x
21. Kovács, A. M., Kühn, S., Gergely, G., Csibra, G., & Brass, M. (2014). Are all beliefs equal? Implicit belief attributions recruiting core brain regions of theory of mind. PLoS ONE, 9(9), Article e106558. Retrieved from http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0106558
22. Kovács, A. M., Téglás, E., & Endress, A. D. (2010). The social sense: Susceptibility to others’ beliefs in human infants and adults. Science, 330, 1830–1834. doi:10.1126/science.1190792
23. Low, J., & Perner, J. (2012). Implicit and explicit theory of mind: State of the art. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 30, 1–13. doi:10.1111/j.2044-835X.2011.02074.x
24. Luo, Y. (2011). Do 10-month-old infants understand others’ false beliefs? Cognition, 121, 289–298. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2011.07.011
25. Müller, U., Zelazo, P. D., & Imrisek, S. (2005). Executive function and children’s understanding of false belief: How specific is the relation? Cognitive Development, 20, 173–189. doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2004.12.004
26. Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs? Science, 308, 255–258. doi:10.1126/science.1107621
27. Open Science Collaboration. (2012). An open, large-scale, collaborative effort to estimate the reproducibility of psychological science. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 657–660. doi:10.1177/1745691612462588
28. Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1978). When is attribution of beliefs justified? Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 1, 592–593. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00076895
29. Simonsohn, U. (2015). Small telescopes: Detectability and the evaluation of replication results. Psychological Science, 26, 559–569. doi:10.1177/0956797614567341
30. Surian, L., Caldi, S., & Sperber, D. (2007). Attribution of beliefs by 13-month-old infants. Psychological Science, 18, 580–586. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01943.x
31. Surian, L., & Geraci, A. (2012). Where will the triangle look for it? Attributing false beliefs to a geometric shape at 17 months. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 30, 30–44. doi:10.1111/j.2044-835X.2011.02046.x
32. Telford, C. W. (1931). The refractory phase of voluntary and associative responses. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 14, 1–36. doi:10.1037/h0073262
33. van der Wel, R. P., Sebanz, N., & Knoblich, G. (2014). Do people automatically track others’ beliefs? Evidence from a continuous measure. Cognition, 130, 128–133. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2013.10.004
34. Wertz, A. E., & German, T. C. (2007). Belief–desire reasoning in the explanation of behavior: Do actions speak louder than words? Cognition, 105, 184–194. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2006.08.002
35. Wimmer, H. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition, 13, 103–128. doi:10.1016/0010-02778390004-5
36. Young, L., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Saxe, R. (2007). The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 104, 8235–8240. doi:10.1073/pnas.0701408104