Tying the autocrat's hands: The rise of the rule of law in China

Tying the Autocrat's Hands: The Rise of the Rule of Law in China

Volumn , Issue , 2015, Pages 1-197

  Wang, Yuhua ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

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EID: 84952645073     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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