Can private money buy public science? Disease group lobbying and federal funding for biomedical research

Management Science

Volumn 61, Issue 10, 2015, Pages 2281-2298

  Hegde, Deepak ^a   Sampat, Bhaven ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Columbia University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Earmarks; Lobbying; National Institutes of Health; Research and development

Indexed keywords

MANAGEMENT; OPERATIONS RESEARCH;

BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH; EARMARKS; LOBBYING; NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH; POLICY DECISIONS; POLITICAL INFLUENCES; POLITICAL SUPPORT; RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT;

FINANCE;

EID: 84943567958     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2107     Document Type: Article

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