DECISION MAKING;
FEDERAL SYSTEM;
HEALTH EXPENDITURE;
HEALTH POLICY;
HEALTH SERVICES;
BUDGET;
FUNDING;
MEDICAL RESEARCH;
POLITICS;
PRIORITY JOURNAL;
RESOURCE ALLOCATION;
REVIEW;
UNITED STATES;
ACADEMIES AND INSTITUTES;
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH;
BUDGETS;
FINANCING, GOVERNMENT;
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (U.S.);
PEER REVIEW, RESEARCH;
POLITICS;
RESEARCH SUPPORT AS TOPIC;
UNITED STATES;
National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics, Survey of Research and Development Expenditures at Universities and Colleges NSF
National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics, Survey of Research and Development Expenditures at Universities and Colleges (NSF, Washington, DC. 2006); www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf08300/pdf/nsf08300.pdf.
We utilized those research performers with observations and/or variation in at least two time periods. Those performers that received NIH grants once or twice during the period of our study received less than 13% of the total grant amount allocated by the NIH during 1984-2003, and the mean size of these grants was less than half the mean size for performers that were represented in our data set more than twice. Our estimates capture the effect of subcommittee representation on the size of grants for grant recipients. The presence of a new grant effect will not alter our results on the influence of appropriations committee representation unless we believe that applicants of new grants and additional grants differently affect the probability or number of representatives on the committee which does not seem plausible
We utilized those research performers with observations and/or variation in at least two time periods. Those performers that received NIH grants once or twice during the period of our study received less than 13% of the total grant amount allocated by the NIH during 1984-2003, and the mean size of these grants was less than half the mean size for performers that were represented in our data set more than twice. Our estimates capture the effect of subcommittee representation on the size of grants for grant recipients. The presence of a "new grant effect" will not alter our results on the influence of appropriations committee representation unless we believe that applicants of new grants and additional grants differently affect the probability or number of representatives on the committee (which does not seem plausible).
5
57849095890
Further information, including background, construction of the data set, the empirical model, results, and estimates, as well as examples, are provided in the supporting online material available in Science Online.
Further information, including background, construction of the data set, the empirical model, results, and estimates, as well as examples, are provided in the supporting online material available in Science Online.
6
57849103173
contains additional robustness checks that investigate the endogeneity of LHHE representation and grant receipts, and various related results, in press
D. Hegde, J. Law Econ. (in press) contains additional robustness checks that investigate the endogeneity of LHHE representation and grant receipts, and various related results.
This result may reflect the tendency for senators, who serve on many more committees and subcommittees, not to specialize in analyzing and influencing appropriations for individual agencies to the same extent as House appropriations committee members. See, for instance, 8
This result may reflect the tendency for senators, who serve on many more committees and subcommittees, not to specialize in analyzing and influencing appropriations for individual agencies to the same extent as House appropriations committee members. See, for instance, (8).
8
57849166753
Little, Brown, Boston
R. F. Fenno, Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress (Little, Brown, Boston, 1966).
NIH, Activity Codes, Organizational Codes, and Definitions Used in Extramural Programs (NIH, Bethesda, MD, July 2007), http://grants.nih.gov/ grants/funding/ac.pdf
