Does managerial entrenchment motivate the insurance decision?

International Review of Financial Analysis

Volumn 24, Issue , 2012, Pages 117-128

  Jiang, Wei ^a   Adams, Mike ^b   Jia Upreti, Joy ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BATH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Agency costs; China; Insurance; Managerial entrenchment

Indexed keywords

EID: 84942551797     PISSN: 10575219     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2012.08.009     Document Type: Article

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