Winner-Take-All Crowdsourcing Contests with Stochastic Production

Proceedings of the 1st AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing, HCOMP 2013

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 34-41

  Cavallo, Ruggiero ^b   Jain, Shaili ^a  

^a MICROSOFT   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; STOCHASTIC MODELS; STOCHASTIC SYSTEMS;

CONDITION; HIGH QUALITY; PROBABILISTICS; STOCHASTIC PRODUCTION; STOCHASTICS; WINNER-TAKE-ALL;

CROWDSOURCING;

EID: 84940458002     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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