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Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 856-868

Optimal crowdsourcing contests

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE;

EID: 84860151940     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1137/1.9781611973099.69     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (80)

References (11)
  • 2
    • 1542532493 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Auctions Versus Negotiations
    • J. Bulow and P. Klemperer. Auctions versus negotiations. American Economic Review, 86:180-194, 1996. (Pubitemid 126420170)
    • (1996) American Economic Review , vol.86 , Issue.1 , pp. 180-194
    • Bulow, J.1    Klemperer, P.2
  • 3
    • 0030305641 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The all-pay auction with complete information
    • 10.1007/BF01211819
    • Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, and Casper G. de Vries. The all-pay auction with complete information. Economic Theory, 8:291-305, 1996. 10.1007/BF01211819.
    • (1996) Economic Theory , vol.8 , pp. 291-305
    • Baye, M.R.1    Kovenock, D.2    De Vries, C.G.3
  • 8
    • 0000288112 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The optimal allocation of prizes in contests
    • Benny Moldovanu and Aner Sela. The optimal allocation of prizes in contests. American Economic Review, 91(3):542-558, 2001.
    • (2001) American Economic Review , vol.91 , Issue.3 , pp. 542-558
    • Moldovanu, B.1    Sela, A.2


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.