Efficient crowdsourcing contests

11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2012, AAMAS 2012: Innovative Applications Track

Volumn 2, Issue , 2012, Pages 576-583

  Cavallo, Ruggiero ^a   Jain, Shaili ^b  

^a YAHOO RESEARCH   (United States)

^b Yale University   (United States)

Author keywords

Contests; Crowdsourcing; Mechanism design; Social welfare

Indexed keywords

MACHINE DESIGN; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; OPTIMIZATION;

ALGORITHMIC ASPECTS; CONTESTS; CROWDSOURCING; INCENTIVE MECHANISM; MECHANISM DESIGN; OPTIMAL POLICIES; PRODUCTION PROCESS; SOCIAL WELFARE;

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS;

EID: 84893185641     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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