When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 28, Issue 8, 2015, Pages 1095-1113

  Samuelson, Peter L ^a   Church, Ian M ^b  

^a FULLER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY   (United States)

^b SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Heuristics and Biases; Intellectual Arrogance; Intellectual Humility; Virtue Epistemology

Indexed keywords

EID: 84938424114     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: 1465394X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2014.904197     Document Type: Article

References (63)

1. M.Alfano, (2012). Expanding the situationist challenge to responsibilist virtue epistemology. Philosophical Quarterly, 62, 223–249.
2. I.A.Apperly,, & S.A.Butterfill, (2009). Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states? Psychological Review, 116, 953–970.
3. D.A.Armor,, & S.E.Taylor, (2002). When predictions fail: The dilemma of unrealistic optimism. In T.Gilovich, D.Griffin, & D.Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 334–347). New York: Cambridge University Press.
4. M.C.Ashton,, & K.Lee, (2005). Honesty-Humility, the Big Five, and the five-factor model. Journal of Personality, 73, 1321–1353.
5. G.Axtell, (forthcoming). Thinking twice about virtue and vice: From epistemic situationism to dual process theories. In M.Alfano & A.Fairweather (Eds.), Epistemic situationism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6. J.Baron, (1994). Thinking and deciding (2nd ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press.
7. S.A.J.Birch,, & D.M.Bernstein, (2007). What can children tell us about hindsight bias: A fundamental constraint on perspective-taking? Social Cognition, 25, 98–113.
8. H.Blank,, V.Fischer,, & E.Erdfelder, (2003). Hindsight bias in political elections. Memory, 11, 491–504.
9. J.T.Cacioppo,, & R.E.Petty, (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 116–131.
10. S.Chaiken,, W.Wood,, & A.Eagly, (1996). Principles of persuasion. In E.T.Higgins & A.W.Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (pp. 702–742). New York: Guilford.
11. E.Conee,, & R.Feldman, (1998). The generality problem for reliabilism. Philosophical Studies, 89, 1–29.
12. D.Dunning,, J.I.Krueger,, & M.D.Alicke, (2005). The self in social perception: Looking back, looking ahead. In M.D.Alicke, D.A.Dunning, & J.I.Krueger (Eds.), The self in social judgment (pp. 269–280). New York: Psychology Press.
13. D.Dunning,, A.Leuenberger,, & D.A.Sherman, (1995). A new look at motivated inference: Are self-serving theories of success a product of motivational forces? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 58–68.
14. D.Dunning,, J.A.Meyerowitz,, & A.D.Holzberg, (2002). Ambiguity and self-evaluation: The role of idiosyncratic trait definition in self-serving assessments of ability. In T.Gilovich, D.Griffin, & D.Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 324–333). New York: Cambridge University Press.
15. N.Epley,, & T.Gilovich, (2002). Putting adjustment back in the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. In T.Gilovich, D.Griffin, & D.Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 139–149). New York: Cambridge University Press.
16. S.Epstein,, A.Lipson,, C.Holstein,, & E.Huh, (1992). Irrational reactions to negative outcomes: Evidence for two conceptual systems. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 328–339.
17. J.T.Evans, (2007). Hypothetical thinking: Dual processes in reasoning and judgment. New York: Psychology Press.
18. J.T.Evans,, & K.E.Stanovich, (2013). Dual-Process theories of higher cognition: Advancing the debate. Perspectives On Psychological Science, 8, 223–241.
19. W.Fleeson, (2004). Moving personality beyond the person-situation debate: The challenge and the opportunity of within-person variability. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 13, 83–87.
20. D.T.Gilbert,, & P.S.Malone, (1995). The correspondence bias. Psychological Bulletin, 117, 21–38.
21. T.Gilovich, (1991). How we know what isn't so: The fallibility of human reason in everyday life. New York: Free Press.
22. T.Gilovich,, D.Griffin,, & D.Kahneman, (Eds.). (2002). Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment. New York: Cambridge University Press.
23. J.Greco, (2003). Virtue and luck, epistemic and otherwise. Metaphilosophy, 34, 353–366.
24. J.Greco, (2009). Knowledge and success from ability. Philosophical Studies, 142, 17–26.
25. J.Greco, (2010). Achieving knowledge: A virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
26. J.Greco, (2012). A (different) virtue epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85(1), 1–26.
27. C.L.Guenther,, & M.D.Alicke, (2010). Deconstructing the better-than-average effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 755–770.
28. A.Hergovich,, R.Schott,, & C.Burger, (2010). Biased evaluation of abstracts depending on topic and conclusion: Further evidence of a confirmation bias within scientific psychology. Current Psychology, 29, 188–209.
29. E.Jonas,, S.Schulz-Hardt,, D.Frey,, & N.Thelen, (2001). Confirmation bias in sequential information search after preliminary decisions: An expansion of dissonance theoretical research on selective exposure to information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 557–571.
30. D.Kahneman, (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
31. D.Kahneman,, & S.Frederick, (2002). Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment. In T.Gilovich, D.Griffin, & D.Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 49–81). New York: Cambridge University Press.
32. J.Kruger, (1999). Lake Wobegon be gone! The ‘below-average effect’ and the egocentric nature of comparative ability judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 221–232.
33. A.W.Kruglanski, (1990). Lay epistemic theory in social-cognitive psychology. Psychological Inquiry, 1, 181–197.
34. A.W.Kruglanski,, M.Dechesne,, E.Orehek,, & A.Pierro, (2009). Three decades of lay epistemics: The why, how, and who of knowledge formation. European Review of Social Psychology, 20, 146–191.
35. A.W.Kruglanski,, & O.Mayseless, (1987). Motivational effects in the social comparison of opinions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 834–842.
36. Z.Kunda, (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 108, 480–498.
37. R.R.McCrae,, & P.T.Costa, Jr (1997). Personality trait structure as a human universal. American Psychologist, 52, 509–516.
38. H.Mercier,, & D.Sperber, (2011). Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34, 57–74.
39. D.T.Miller, (1999). The norm of self-interest. American Psychologist, 54, 1053–1060.
40. D.Narvaez, (2008). Human flourishing and moral development: Cognitive and neurobiological perspectives of virtue development. In L.P.Nucci & D.Narvaez (Eds.), Handbook of moral development (pp. 310–327). New York: Routledge.
41. R.S.Nickerson, (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review of General Psychology, 2, 175–220.
42. L.Olin,, & J.M.Doris, (forthcoming). Vicious minds. Philosophical Studies.
43. R.E.Petty,, D.T.Wegener,, & P.H.White, (1998). Flexible correction processes in social judgment: Implications for persuasion. Social Cognition, 16, 93–113.
44. A.Plantinga, (1993). Warrant: The current debate. New York: Oxford University Press.
45. D.Pritchard, (2005). Epistemic luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
46. E.Pronin,, J.Berger,, & S.Molouki, (2007). Alone in a crowd of sheep: Asymmetric perceptions of conformity and their roots in an introspection illusion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 585–595.
47. E.Pronin,, & M.B.Kugler, (2007). Valuing thoughts, ignoring behavior: The introspection illusion as a source of the bias blind spot. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 565–578.
48. L.Ross,, & A.Ward, (1996). Naive realism in everyday life: Implications for social conflict and misunderstanding. In E.S.Reed, E.Turiel, & T.Brown (Eds.), Values and knowledge (pp. 103–135). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
49. P.L.Samuelson,, I.M.Church,, M.Jarvinen,, & T.Paulus, (2012). The science of intellectual humility white paper. Unpublished manuscript, Pasadena, California: School of Psychology, Fuller Theological Seminary.
50. L.J.Sanna,, N.Schwarz,, & S.L.Stocker, (2002). When debiasing backfires: Accessible content and accessibility experiences in debiasing hindsight. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 28, 497–502.
51. D.Schneider,, R.Lam,, A.P.Bayliss,, & P.E.Dux, (2012). Cognitive load disrupts implicit theory-of-mind processing. Psychological Science, 23, 842–847.
52. C.Sedikides,, & A.P.Gregg, (2008). Self-Enhancement: Food for thought. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, 102–116.
53. C.Sedikides,, R.S.Horton,, & A.P.Gregg, (2007). The why's the limit: Curtailing self-enhancement with explanatory introspection. Journal of Personality, 75, 783–824.
54. S.A.Sloman, (2002). Two systems of reasoning. In T.Gilovich, D.Griffin, & D.Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 379–396). New York: Cambridge University Press.
55. K.E.Stanovich, (1999). Who is rational? Studies of individual differences in reasoning. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
56. K.E.Stanovich, (2009). Distinguishing the reflective, algorithmic, and autonomous minds: Is it time for a tri-process theory? In J.Evans & K.Frankish (Eds.), In two minds: Dual processes and beyond (pp. 55–88). New York: Oxford University Press.
57. K.E.Stanovich,, & R.F.West, (1997). Reasoning independently of prior belief and individual differences in actively open-minded thinking. Journal of Educational Psychology, 89, 342–357.
58. K.E.Stanovich,, & R.F.West, (1998). Individual differences in rational thought. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 127, 161–188.
59. K.E.Stanovich,, & R.F.West, (2007). Natural myside bias is independent of cognitive ability. Thinking & Reasoning, 13, 225–247.
60. A.R.Todd,, G.V.Bodenhausen,, J.A.Richeson,, & A.D.Galinsky, (2011). Perspective taking combats automatic expressions of racial bias. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 1027–1042.
61. D.T.Wegener,, & R.E.Petty, (1997). The Flexible Correction Model: The role of naive theories of bias in bias correction. In M.P.Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 29, pp. 141–208). London: Academic Press.
62. T.D.Wilson,, D.B.Centerbar,, & N.Brekke, (2002). Mental contamination and the debiasing problem. In T.Gilovich, D.Griffin, & D.Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 185–200). New York: Cambridge University Press.
63. L.Zagzebski, (1996). Virtues of the mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.