Lay Understanding of Forensic Statistics: Evaluation of Random Match Probabilities, Likelihood Ratios, and Verbal Equivalents

Law and Human Behavior

Volumn 39, Issue 4, 2015, Pages 332-349

  Thompson, William C ^a   Newman, Eryn J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bayesian models; evidence; forensic science; jury decision making; probability

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; EXPERT WITNESS; FORENSIC SCIENCE; HUMAN; LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE; STATISTICAL MODEL; STATISTICS;

DECISION MAKING; EXPERT TESTIMONY; FORENSIC SCIENCES; HUMANS; LIKELIHOOD FUNCTIONS; STATISTICS AS TOPIC;

EID: 84937073376     PISSN: 01477307     EISSN: 1573661X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/lhb0000134     Document Type: Article

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