Extending the Confusion About Bayes

Modern Law Review

Volumn 74, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 444-455

  Robertson, Bernard ^a   Vignaux, G A ^b   Berger, Charles E H ^a  

^a Victoria University of Wellington ^*  (New Zealand)

^b VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79959731195     PISSN: 00267961     EISSN: 14682230     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2230.2011.00857.x     Document Type: Article

References (17)

1. 'Expressing evaluative opinions: a position statement' signed by numerous leading forensic scientists in201151 Sci & J 1.
2. For a highly accessible explanation see: I. W. Evett, 'Interpretation: a personal odyssey' in: C. G. G. Aitken and A. D. Stoney (eds), The Use of Statistics in Forensic Science (New York: Ellis Horwood19919-22
3. The way this is done is explained in: B. Robertson and G. A. Vignaux, Interpreting Evidence: Evaluating Forensic Science in the Courtroom (Chichester; New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1st ed1995
4. For the full story see D. Kaye, 'The probability of an ultimate issue: the strange case of paternity testing' 1 Iowa LR 751989
5. For an example in handwriting analysis, see: N. Köller et al, Probability Conclusions in Expert Opinions on Handwriting (Munich: Wolters Kluwer, 2004). See also: I. M. Ellman and D. Kaye, 'Probabilities and proof: can HLA and blood group testing prove paternity?' (1979) 54 NYULR 1131, and A. Biedermann et al, 'Equal prior probabilities: Can one do any better?' (2007) 85 For Sci Intntl 1722007
6. Re JS (a minor) [1981] Fam 22, 29; [1980] 1 All ER 1061 per Ormrod LJ1981
7. For discussion of more issues arising from a narrow view of probability on the part of many lawyers see B. Robertson and G. A. Vignaux, 'Probability-The Logic of the Law' 13 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 4571993
8. See 'Correspondence'' (1996) 36 Sci & J 290-292 and (1997) 37 Sci & J 64-65, following D. A. Rudram, 'Interpretation of scientific evidence' (1996) 36 Sci & J133-1381996
9. Pace R v T at [73] where the Court regards the statement 'could have made the mark' as more precise than 'moderate (scientific) support
10. C. Neumann et alComputation of Likelihood Ratios in Fingerprint Identification for Configurations of Any Number of Minutiae2007
11. 'At the present time, in most jurisdictions, an opinion of certainty is the only acceptable opinion when dealing with the individualization of a fingerprint impression. This is not a rule that has been laid down by the courts (who will deal with any opinion offered) but rather by fingerprint examiners. There is no scientific basis for the rule. It is simply one of the aberrations that have developed within the discipline of fingerprint identification.' H. Tuthill, Individualization: Principles and Procedures in Criminalistics (Salem, Oregon: Lightning Powder Company, Inc1994
12. International Association for Identification Resolution 2010-18, Adopted July 16, 2010 in Spokane. (last visited 21 February2011
13. W. Thompson and E. SchumannInterpretation of statistical evidence in criminal trials: the prosecutor's fallacy and the defense attorney's fallacy' (1987) 11 Law and Human Behaviour 167; P. Diaconis and D. Freedman, 'The persistence of cognitive illusions' (1981) 4 The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 333; I. W. Evett, 'Avoiding the transposed conditional' (1995) 35 Sci & J 127; and B. Robertson and G. A. Vignaux, Interpreting Evidence: Evaluating Forensic Science in the Courtroom n 3 above ch 6
14. Other examples are at [30], [31], [50], [67] and [69]
15. Two of the present authors vigorously criticised Adams at the time, see Robertson and Vignaux, Bayes Theorem in the Court of Appeal' 69 The Criminal Lawyer 4, text available at: tinyurl.com/denisadams1997
16. Assuming the evidence is independent and the same hypotheses apply
17. Position Statement, n 1 above