When are people persuaded by DNA match statistics?

Law and Human Behavior

Volumn 25, Issue 5, 2001, Pages 493-513

  Koehler, Jonathan J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; ATTITUDE; CRIMINAL LAW; DECISION MAKING; DNA FINGERPRINTING; EXPERT WITNESS; FEMALE; HUMAN; LEGAL ASPECT; MALE; MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS; PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION; PROBABILITY; REPRODUCIBILITY; STANDARD; STATISTICAL ANALYSIS; STATISTICAL MODEL; SYSTEMS THEORY; UNITED STATES;

ADULT; ATTITUDE; CRIMINAL LAW; DATA INTERPRETATION, STATISTICAL; DECISION MAKING; DNA FINGERPRINTING; EXPERT TESTIMONY; FEMALE; HUMANS; MALE; MODELS, STATISTICAL; MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS; PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION; PROBABILITY; REPRODUCIBILITY OF RESULTS; SYSTEMS THEORY; UNITED STATES;

EID: 0035487641     PISSN: 01477307     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1012892815916     Document Type: Article

References (66)

1. ABC News (1998, January 30). World News Tonight with Peter Jennings.
2. Aitken, C. G. G. (1995). Statistics and the evaluation of evidence for forensic scientists. Chichester: Wiley.
3. Arkes, H. R. (1993). Some practical judgment and decision-making research. In N. J. Castellan, Jr. (Ed.), Individual and group decision making: Current issues (pp. 3-18). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
4. Arkes, H. R., Connolly, T., & Hammond, K. R. (Eds.). (2000). Judgment and decision making: An interdisciplinary reader. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. CBS News (1998, January 29). Evening news with Dan Rather.
6. Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1996). Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertainty. Cognition, 58, 1-73.
7. Denes-Raj, V., & Epstein, S. (1994). Conflict between intuitive and rational processing: When people behave against their better judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 819-829.
8. Epstein, S., Lipson, A., Holstein, C., & Huh, E. (1992). Irrational reactions to negative outcomes: Evidence for two conceptual systems. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 328-339.
9. Evett, I. W., & Weir, B. S. (1998). Interpreting DNA evidence: Statistical genetics for forensic scientists. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates.
10. Faigman, D. L., & Baglioni, A. J., Jr. (1988). Bayes' Theorem in the trial process. Law and Human Behavior, 12, 1-17.
11. Finucane, M. L., Alhakami, A., Slovic, P., & Johnson, S. M. (2000). The affect heuristic in judgments of risks and benefits. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 13, 1-17.
12. Fienberg, S. E. (Ed.). (1989). The evolving role of statistical assessments as evidence in the courts. New York: Springer-Verlag.
13. Gigerenzer, G. (1998). Ecological intelligence: An adaptation for frequencies. In D. Cummins & C. Allen (Eds.), The evolution of mind (pp. 9-29). New York: Oxford University Press.
14. Gigerenzer G., & Hoffrage U. (1995). How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instructions: Frequency formats. Psychological Review, 102, 684-704.
15. Gilbert, D. T., & Osborne, R. E. (1989). Thinking backward: Some curable and incurable consequences of cognitive busyness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 940-949.
16. Goodman, J. (1986). Probabilistic scientific evidence: Jurors' inferences. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Washington, Ann Arbor, MI (University Microfilms no. 8706571).
17. Goodman, J. (1992). Jurors' comprehension and assessment of probabilistic evidence. American Journal of Trial Advocacy, 16, 361-389.
18. Hansen, D. E., & Helgeson, J. G. (1996). The effects of statistical training on choice heuristics in choice under uncertainty. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 9, 41-57.
19. Harries, C., & Harvey, N. (2000). Are absolute frequencies, relative frequencies, or both effective in reducing cognitive biases? Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 13, 431-444.
20. Hogarth, R. M. (Ed.). (1991). Judgment and choice (2nd ed.). Chichester: Wiley.
21. Hogarth, R. M., & Einhorn, H. J. (1992). Order effects in belief updating: The belief-adjustment model. Cognitive Psychology, 24, 1-55.
22. Kahneman, D., & Lovallo, D. (1993). Bold forecasting and timid decisions: A cognitive perspective on risk taking. Management Science, 39, 17-31.
23. Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristic and biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
24. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1982). Variants of uncertainty. Cognition, 11, 143-157.
25. Kaye, D. H. (1993). DNA evidence: Probability, population genetics, and the courts. Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 7, 101-172.
26. Kaye, D. H., & Koehler, J. J. (1991). Can jurors understand probabilistic evidence? Journal of the Royal Statistical Society A, 154, 75-81.
27. Kaye, D. H., & Sensabaugh, G. F. (2000). Reference guide on DNA evidence. In Reference manual on scientific evidence (2nd ed., pp. 485-576). Washington, DC, Federal Judicial Center.
28. Kirkpatrick, L. A., & Epstein, S. (1992). Cognitive-experiential self-theory and subjective probability: Further evidence for two conceptual systems. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 534-544.
29. Klar, Y., Medding, A., & Sarel, D. (1996). Nonunique invulnerability: Singular versus distributional probabilities and unrealistic optimism in comparative risk judgments. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 67, 229-245.
30. Koehler, J. J. (1996). On conveying the probative value of DNA evidence: Frequencies, likelihood ratios and error rates. University of Colorado Law Review, 67, 859-886.
31. Koehler, J. J. (1997). One in millions, billions and trillions: Lessons from People v. Collins (1968) for People v. Simpson (1995). Journal of Legal Education, 47, 214-223.
32. Koehler, J. J. (in press). The psychology of numbers in the courtroom: How to make DNA match statistics seem impressive or insufficient. Southern California Law Review.
33. Koehler, J. J., Chia, A., & Lindsey, J. S. (1995). The random match probability (RMP) in DNA evidence: Irrelevant and prejudicial? Jurimetrics Journal, 35, 201-219.
34. Koehler, J. J., & Macchi, L. (2001). Exemplar cueing theory. Unpublished manuscript.
35. Lander, E. S., & Budowle, B. (1994). DNA fingerprinting dispute laid to rest. Nature, 371, 735-8.
36. Lempert, R. O. (1991a). Some caveats concerning DNA as criminal identification evidence: With thanks to the Reverend Bayes. Cardozo Law Review, 13, 303-341.
37. Lempert, R. O. (1991b). Why do jury research? In R. Hastie (Ed.), Inside the juror (pp. 242-254). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
38. McCoy, M. L., Nunez, N., & Dammeyer, M. M. (1999). The effect of jury deliberations on jurors' reasoning skills. Law and Human Behavior, 23, 557-575.
39. Miller, D. T., Turnbull, W., & McFarland, C. (1989). When coincidence is suspicious: The role of mental simulation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 581-589.
40. Mueller, L. D. (1993). The use of DNA typing in forensic science. Accountability in Research, 3, 55.
41. Nance, D. (2000). An empirical examination of the evidential use of likelihood ratios. Unpublished manuscript.
42. National Research Council. (1992). DNA technology in forensic science. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
43. National Research Council. (1996). The evaluation of forensic DNA evidence. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
44. New York v. Wesley, 533 N.YS.2d 643, 644 (S. Ct. 1988).
45. Nisbett, R. E., Fong, G. T., Lehman, D. R., & Cheng, P. W. (1987). Teaching reasoning. Science, 238, 625-631.
46. Reeves, T., & Lockhart, R. S. (1993). Distributional versus singular approaches to probability and errors in probabilistic reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 122, 207-226.
47. Robertson, B., & Vignaux, G. A. (1995). Interpreting evidence: Evaluating forensic science in the courtroom. Chichester: Wiley.
48. Rowe, B. I. (1997). A possible solution for the problem of juries slighting nonscientific evidence: A Bayesian-like judicial instruction. American Journal of Criminal Law, 24, 541-579.
49. Saks, M. J., & Kidd, R. F. (1980/1981.). Human information processing and adjudication: Trial by heuristics. Law and Society Review, 15, 123-160.
50. Schklar, J., & Diamond, S. (1999). Juror reactions to DNA evidence: Errors and expectancies. Law and Human Behavior, 23, 159-184.
51. Shepard, S. (1998, January 31). That mystery dress: An example of how rumors pass for facts. Houston Chronicle, p. A6.
52. Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 3-22.
53. Slovic, P., & Monahan, J. (1995). Probability, danger and coercion: A study of risk perception and decision making in mental health law. Law and Human Behavior, 19, 49-65.
54. Slovic, P., Monahan, J., & MacGregor, D. G. (2000). Violence risk assessment and risk communication: The effects of using actual cases, providing instruction, and employing probability versus frequency formats. Law and Human Behavior, 24, 271-296.
55. Smith, B. C., Penrod, S. D., Otto, A. L., & Park, R. C. (1996). Jurors' use of probabilistic evidence. Law and Human Behavior, 20, 49-82.
56. Stone, E. R., Yates, F. J., & Parker, A. M. (1994). Risk communication: Absolute versus relative expressions of low-probability risks. Organizational Behavioral and Human Decision Processes, 60, 387-408.
57. Taroni, F., & Aitken, C. G. G. (1998a). Probabilisticreasoning in the law: Part 2. Assessment of probabilities and explanation of the value of trace evidence other than DNA. Science & Justice, 38, 179-188.
58. Taroni, F., & Aitken, C. G. G. (1998b). Probabilisticreasoning in the law: Part I. Assessment of probabilistic and explanation of the value of DNA evidence. Science and Justice, 38, 165-177.
59. Thompson, W. C. (1989). Are juries competent to evaluate statistical evidence? Law and Contemporary Problems, 52, 9-41.
60. Thompson, W. C., Britton, R. L., & Schumann, E. L. (1990). Jurors' sensitivity to variations in statistical evidence. Unpublished manuscript.
61. Thompson, W. C., & Schumann, E. L. (1987). Interpretation of statistical evidence in criminal trials: The prosecutors' fallacy and the defense attorney's fallacy. Law and Human Behavior, 11, 167-187.
62. Teigen, K. H., Brun, W., & Frydenlund, R. (1999). Probability and risk judgments: The role of frequentistic information. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 12, 123-139.
63. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5, 207-232.
64. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185, 1124-1131.
65. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional verses intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293-315.
66. Wells, G. L. (1992). Naked statistical evidence of liability: Is subjective probability enough? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 739-752.