The paradox of predictivism

The Paradox of Predictivism

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-265

  Barnes, Eric Christian ^a  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 84929754305     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511487330     Document Type: Book

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