Predictivism for pluralists

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Volumn 56, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 421-450

  Barnes, Eric Christian ^a  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 24644455179     PISSN: 00070882     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axi131     Document Type: Article

References (50)

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