How not to defend constructive empiricism: A rejoinder

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 47, Issue 188, 1997, Pages 369-372

  Psillos, Stathis ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041291481     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00066     Document Type: Note

References (7)

1. S. Psillos, 'On van Fraassen's Critique of Abductive Reasoning', The Philosophical Quarterly, 46 (1996), pp. 31-47;
2. J. Ladyman et al., 'A Defence of van Fraassen's Critique of Abductive Inference: Reply to Psillos', this journal pp. 305-21
3. 'Theory Confirmation: Tension and Conflict', Seventh International Wittgenstein Symposium (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1983), pp. 319-29, at p. 327.
4. L. Laudan, Beyond Positivism and Relativism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996);
5. 'Naturalism without Truth?', Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science (forthcoming).
6. G. Harman, 'Pragmatism and the Reasons for Belief', in C.B. Kulp (ed.), Realism/Anti-realism and Epistemology (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming),
7. T. Day and H. Kincaid, 'Putting Inference to the Best Explanation in its Place', Synthese, 98 (1994), pp. 271-95, esp. pp. 285-7,