Neither truth nor empirical adequacy explain novel success

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 80, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 418-431

  Barnes, Eric Christine ^a  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 50949091263     PISSN: 00048402     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/713659528     Document Type: Article

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