Estimating the severity of the wikileaks U.S. diplomatic cables disclosure

Political Analysis

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2015, Pages 299-305

  Gilld, Michael ^a   Spirling, Arthur ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84929665052     PISSN: 10471987     EISSN: 14764989     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/pan/mpv005     Document Type: Article

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