Soft paternalism, merit goods, and normative individualism

European Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 43, Issue 1, 2017, Pages 125-152

  Kirchgässner, Gebhard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Constitutional economics; Democracy; Libertarian paternalism; Merit goods; Normative individualism; Soft paternalism

Indexed keywords

EID: 84929643581     PISSN: 09291261     EISSN: 15729990     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10657-015-9500-5     Document Type: Article

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