On minimal morals

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 330-339

  Kirchgässner, Gebhard ^a,b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

^b German Academy of Sciences Leopoldina   (Germany)

^c CESIFO   (Germany)

Author keywords

Intrinsic motivation; Low cost decisions; Moral behaviour; Voluntary contribution to public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953915142     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.03.003     Document Type: Article

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