The cosmopolitan turn in constitutionalism: On the relationship between constitutionalism in and beyond the state

Ruling the World?: Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 258-325

  Kumm, Mattias ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84928436766     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511627088.011     Document Type: Chapter

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