The legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the pluralist movement

European Law Journal

Volumn 14, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 389-422

  Cruz, Julio Baquero ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 65249124146     PISSN: 13515993     EISSN: 14680386     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0386.2008.00419.x     Document Type: Article

References (187)

1. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1
2. Case 6/64, Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585
3. Case 22/70, Commission v Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263
4. Case 106/77, Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629
5. Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich [1991] I-5357.
6. P. Pescatore, Law of Integration (Sijthoff, 1974).
7. (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2403.
8. Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079.
9. See J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 66-74 and 319-320.
10. See the decisions in A. Oppenheimer (ed), The Relationship Between European Community Law and National Law: The Cases, Vol 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 385, 399 and 712.
11. BVerfG, 89, 155 (1993). English translation in (1994) 69(2) Common Market Law Reports 57.
12. (1994) 69(2) Common Market Law Reports 77.
13. ibid, at 79.
14. This was a somewhat modified restatement of the Solange II judgment of 1986 (BVerfG 73, 339
15. English translation in Oppenheimer, op cit n 7 supra, at 462).
16. ibid, at 86.
17. ibid.
18. ibid, at 88.
19. ibid, at 89.
20. ibid.
21. On the second issue, see Ch. Joerges, 'What is Left of the European Economic Constitution? A Melancholic Eulogy', (2005) 30 European Law Review 461, at 475.
22. (1994) 69(2) Common Market Law Reports 105.
23. ibid, at 108.
24. Cited op cit n 10 supra. I leave aside the issue of its relationship with the prior constitutional case-law of other Member States, in particular with that of the Corte Costituzionale.
25. See J. Kokott, 'Report on Germany', in A.-M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet and J. H. H. Weiler (eds), The European Courts & National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart, 1998), 77, at 81.
26. See the Kloppenburg judgment, BVerfG, 75, 223 (1987)
27. English translation in Oppenheimer, op cit n 7 supra, at 497 and 508-509.
28. ibid, at 516.
29. ibid, at 509.
30. ibid, at 515-516.
31. Some interpreted the decision to mean that any German court and any political or administrative organ in Germany could carry out that review (Ch. Tomuschat, 'Die Europäische Union unter der Aufsicht des Bundesverfassungsgerichts', (1993) 20 Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 489, at 494).
32. Others argued that only the Constitutional Court could carry out that review in very exceptional circumstances (J. Kokott, 'Deutschland im Rahmen der Europäischen Union - zum Vertrag com Maastricht', (1994) 119 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 207, at 218-220).
33. F. Mayer, 'The European Constitution and the Courts', in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart, 2006), 281, at 298.
34. See S. J. Boom, 'The European Union After the Maastricht Decision: Will Germany Be the "Virginia" of Europe?', (1995) 43(2) American Journal of Comparative Law 177, at 217-219.
35. See Decision of 9 January 1996 of the Bundesfinanzhof, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 126
36. Kokott, op cit n 20 supra, at 117, refers to other decisions of lower German courts. On the bananas litigation and the immediate consequences of the Maastricht-Urteil
37. see U. Everling, 'Will Europe Slip on Bananas? The Bananas Judgment of the Court of Justice and National Courts', (1996) 33 Common Market Law Review 401
38. N. Reich, 'Judge-Made "Europe à la carte": Some Remarks on Recent Conflicts Between European and German Constitutional Law Provoked by the Bananas Litigation', (1996) 7(1) European Journal of International Law 103
39. R. Voss, 'Das "Maastricht"-Urteil und die Folgen', (1996) Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft, April, 394
40. F. C. Mayer, Kompetenzüberschreitung und Letztentscheidung (Beck, 2000), 120-131.
41. Judgment of the Finanzgericht Rheinland-Pfalz of 7 November 1994, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 588.
42. For other decisions in which theGerman Constitutional Court was deferential and avoided direct conflicts with the Court, see Mayer, op cit n 28 supra, at 122-130.
43. In addition, a constitutional complaint against the German law ratifying the Amsterdam Treaty and based on theMaastricht-Urteil was declared inadmissible by that Court on 1 April 1998, for lack of fundamental constitutional importance (case 2 BvR 464/98). Curiously enough, Paul Kirchhof, the rapporteur of theMaastricht-Urteil, was one of the three judges in the chamber, and the decision was unanimous. On the doctrinal views of Paul Kirchhof, see section VI below.
44. Order of 7 June 2000, BVerfG, 102, at 147; English translation in Oppenheimer, op cit n 7 supra, Vol 2, 2003, at 270.
45. See M. Nettesheim, 'EU-Recht und nationales Verfassungsrecht', FIDE XX Congress London (BIICL, 2002), 146.
46. See J. Baquero Cruz, Between Competition and Free Movement: The Economic Constitutional Law of the European Community (Hart, 2002), 61.
47. Order of 9 January 2001, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 225.
48. Ch. U. Schmid, 'All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's "Banana Decision"', (2001) 7(1) European Law Journal 95.
49. BVerfGE, 2 BvR 2236/04, judgment of 18 July 2005 (German and English texts can be found at website available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de).
50. [2002] OJ L190, of 18 July 2002, 1.
51. Case C-105/03, Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285.
52. As argued in the dissent of JudgeGerhardt. The Committee on legal affairs of the Bundestag had expressed the same view in a preparatory report. See also Ch. Tomuschat, 'Inconsistencies - The German Federal Constitutional Court on the European Arrest Warrant', (2006) 2(2) European Constitutional Law Review 209, at 222
53. and the comment by A. Hinarejos Parga, (2006) 43(2) Common Market Law Review 583, at 588.
54. See Tomuschat, ibid, at 223-224.
55. In its submissions, the federal government had argued that the supremacy principle means that European law and German law based on it cannot be reviewed against German fundamental rights (para 35 of the judgment). The government also argued that the Constitutional Court should refer a preliminary question to the Luxembourg Court if it had any doubt about the compatibility of the Framework Directive or the implementing law with EU fundamental rights.
56. Europäisches Haftbefehlsgesetz, of 20 July 2006, BGBl, I 1721. On the implementation of the Framework Decision in the Member States, see the European arrest warrant database at Jagiellonian University in Krakow (see website available at http://www.law.uj.edu.pl/~kpk/eaw) and, in particular, the German questionnaire by A. Sinn and L. Wörner.
57. Case 2 BvR 839/05; a prior complaint was declared inadmissible because it was directed against a purely procedural act of the Bundestag: BVerfG, 2 BvE 1/05, of 24 April 2005. A similar complaint has been filed against the Treaty of Lisbon.
58. See the communication to the parties in a press release of the complainant of 31 October 2006 (website available at http://www.petergauweiler.de/pdf/ PresseerklaerungEUVerfassung31.10.06.pdf).
59. J. Dutheil de la Rochère and I. Pernice, 'General Report to FIDE XX Congress 2002 in London', FIDE XX Congress London (BIICL, 2002), 1, at 31: The Maastricht judgment 'seems to have been a "leading" case also for other Member States'.
60. Case No I-361/1997, judgment of 6 April 1998, in Oppenheimer, op cit n 7 supra, Vol 2, at 174.
61. ibid, at 191.
62. ibid, at 189.
63. W. Sadurski, '"Solange, chapter 3": Constitutional Courts in Central Europe - Democracy - European Union', EUI Working Papers Law No 2006/40, 10-19, also refers to a judgment rendered in 2004 by the Hungarian Constitutional Court which I will not analyse here. In that decision, the Hungarian Court ignored the European law issues underlying a case related to agricultural policy measures which implemented Commission Regulations, but it implicitly damaged the supremacy and uniformity of EU law, since the provisions of national law that it declared unconstitutional were identical to provisions of the Commission Regulations. This attitude of 'avoidance' rather than direct 'confrontation' is not in line with theMaastricht-Urteil. It can be compared with the early European case-law of the Spanish Constitutional Court.
64. For an example, see my 'Droit communautaire et étiquetage', (1997) 2 Revue du marché unique européen 117.
65. Judgments of 27 April 2005, P 1/05, and of 11 May 2005, K 18/04 (see website available at http://www.trybunal.gov.pl).
66. See the judgment of 27 April 2005 (Case P 1/05), para 9: 'The Tribunal is not relieved of [its] obligation [to review the conformity of normative acts with the Polish Constitution] where the allegation of nonconformity with the Constitution concerns the scope of a statute implementing European Union law'.
67. See J. Komárek, 'European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: In Search of the Limits of "Contrapunctual Principles"', (2007) 9 Common Market Law Review 16.
68. See the Polish questionnaire (by Górski, Hofmański, Sakowicz and Szumiło-Kulczycka) in the European arrest warrant database, op cit n 42 supra, at 4.
69. Judgment of 7 November 2005 (summarised in document 14281/05 of the Council, of 11 November 2005).
70. See the questionnaire on Cyprus (by Kapardis and Stephanou) in the European arrest warrant database, op cit n 42 supra.
71. Judgment No Pl ÚS 66/04 of 3 May 2006, paras 53-54, referring to jugdment No Pl ÚS 50/04 of 8 March 2006 (which cites Solange II, the Maastricht-Urteil and the Italian and Danish case-law). For a detailed analysis
72. see Komárek, op cit n 52 supra, at 26-30
73. Sadurski, op cit n 49 supra, at 6-10.
74. ibid, at paras 55-58.
75. ibid, at para 60.
76. This decision is in line with Case 314/85, Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199 and with Pupino, op cit n 38 supra.
77. Décision n° 2004/496, of 10 June 2004 (Loi pour la confiance dans l'économie numérique)
78. Décision n° 2004/505 DC, of 19 November 2004 (traité établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe)
79. Décision n° 2006/540 DC, of 27 July 2006 (Loi relative au droit d'auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l'information)
80. décision of the Conseil d'état of 8 February 2007 (Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine et autres, No 287110).
81. Declaration 1/2004, of 13 December 2004 (in Boletín Oficial del Estado, 4 January 2005, No 3, Supplement, 5). Compare with the declaration on the Maastricht Treaty (op cit n 7 supra), which predated the Maastricht-Urteil. On the more recent Declaration
82. see G. C. Rodríguez Iglesias, 'No existe contradicción entre la Constitución española y la Constitución europea: La Declaración del Tribunal Constitucional', (2005) 9(20) Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo 5
83. A. López Castillo, A. Saiz Arnaiz and V. Ferreres Comella, Constitución española y Constitución europea (Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2005).
84. See the main judgments (Frontini, Granital and Fragd) in Oppenheimer, op cit n 7 supra, at 629, 643 and 653.
85. As argued by A. Estella de Noriega in 'A Dissident Voice: The Spanish Constitutional Court Case Law on European Integration', (1999) 5(2) European Public Law 269, at 293-295.
86. F. Castillo de la Torre, (2005) 42(4) Common Market Law Review 1169, at 1193-1196, considers that the Opinion is more in line with the Italian case-law on the guarantee of the constitutional core of fundamental values and principles than with the German case-law on review of ultra vires acts; one should bear in mind, however, that the latter is also based on the protection of that core and the constitutional right to democratic participation.
87. See BVerfGE, 31, 145 (1971)
88. English translation in Oppenheimer, op cit n 7 supra, Vol 1, at 415.
89. Judgment of 13 July 2005 (No 124/2005), para B.10 (my translation).
90. The decision can be compared with other precedents of the Cour d'arbitrage which were less friendly to Treaty law (see H. Bribosia, 'Report on Belgium', in Slaughter, Stone Sweet and Weiler, op cit n 20 supra, at 3, at 24-25). The reference is Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld. Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered his Opinion on 12 September 2006. He mentions the annulment of the transposition of the Framework Decision in Poland, Germany and Cyprus, expressing the 'hope that other constitutional courts, which are reluctant to accept their responsibilities as Community courts, will follow the example and enter into a dialogue with the Court of Justice which is essential for the purpose of building a united Europe' (n 20).
91. See the judgment of the Court of the European Communities of 3 May 2007 in Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld (not yet reported). The Court upheld the validity of the Framework Decision concerning the instrument used and the principles of legality, equality and non-discrimination, but it did not deal with the issues that determined the unconstitutionality of the implementing legislation in Poland, Germany and Cyprus.
92. See M. Claes, 'Constitutionalizing Europe at its Source: The "European Clauses" in the National Constitutions: Evolution and Typology', (2005) 24 Yearbook of European Law 81, at 105.
93. See Mayer, op cit n 26 supra, at 325, n 263.
94. See Kokott, op cit n 20 supra, at 130.
95. See the debates leading to the amendment: Website available at http://www.parlamento.pt.
96. See El País, 9 May 2007.
97. Consejo de Estado, Informe sobre modificaciones de la Constitución española, February 2006, 46 (see website available at http://www.consejo-estado.es).
98. See also F. Rubio Llorente and J. Álvarez Junco (eds), El informe del Consejo de Estado sobre la reforma constitucional: Texto del informe y debates académicos (Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2006).
99. ibid, at 87-88 and 85: 'la necesidad de garantizar la permanencia de la esencia de la estatalidad española'; 'el contenido irrenunciable de la Constitución'.
100. Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759.
101. Case C-376/98, Germany v Council [2000] ECR I-8419.
102. Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR I-5281.
103. On this decision, see my 'Disintegration of the Law of Integration in the External Economic Relations of the European Community', (1997) 3(2) Columbia Journal of European Law 257.
104. See, for example, A. Peters, Elemente einer Theorie der Verfassung Europas (Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 425
105. A. Arnull, 'From Bit Part to Starring Role? The Court of Justice and Europe's Constitutional Treaty', (2005) 24 Yearbook of European Law 1, at 10
106. M. Kumm, 'The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty', (2005) 11(3) European Law Journal 262, at 296.
107. U. Everling, 'The Maastricht Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court and its Significance for the Development of the European Union', (1994) 14 Yearbook of European Law 14, at 14-15.
108. As defined by Bruno de Witte in 'The Closest Thing to a Constitutional Conversation in Europe: The Semi-Permanent Treaty Revision Process', in P. Beaumont, C. Lyons and N. Walker (eds), Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law (Hart, 2002), 137.
109. On this constitutional function of the Court, see G. C. Rodríguez Iglesias and J. Baquero Cruz, 'Funciones constitucionales del Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas', (2006) 4 Fundamentos 291, at 324-331.
110. Case 262/88, Barber [1990] ECR I-1889.
111. Judgment, op cit n 36 supra, at para 75.
112. See, in particular, his articles in the Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, which he directs with Josef Isensee: 'Die Identität der Verfassung in ihren unabänderlichen Inhalten', Vol I (Müller, 1988), 775
113. 'Der deutsche Staat im Prozeß der europäischen Integration', Vol VII, ibid, 1992, at 855.
114. P. Kirchhof, 'Deutsches Verfassungsrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht', (1991) 1 Europarecht, Beiheft 11, at 12.
115. ibid, at 13-14.
116. ibid, at 25.
117. ibid, at 45.
118. C. Grewe, 'L'arrêt de la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale allemande du 12 octobre 1993 sur le Traité de Maastricht: L'Union européenne et les droits fondamentaux', (1993) 5(7-8) Revue universelle des droits de l'homme 226, at 230: 'réécriture de l'article 23'. The restrictive interpretation of Article 23 of the German Constitution with a view to safeguard State sovereignty was defended by
119. P. Kirchhof, op cit n 83 supra, at 16
120. D. Murswiek, 'Maastricht und der pouvoir constituant: Zur Bedeutung der verfassunggebenden Gewalt im Prozeß der europäischen Integration', (1993) 32 Der Staat 161
121. U. di Fabio (currently a judge at the German Constitutional Court), 'Der neue Art. 23 des Grundgesetzes: Positivierung vollzogenen Verfassungswandels oder Verfassungsneuschöpfung?', (1993) 32 Der Staat 191. The same logic was followed in the judgment on the European arrest warrant: Article 16(2), introduced to allow for the extradition of German nationals, was interpreted restrictively in order to preserve as much as possible of the previous normative state of affairs.
122. See Tomuschat, op cit n 25 supra, at 496
123. S. Hobe, 'The German State in Europe After the Maastricht Decision of the German Constitutional Court', (1994) 37 German Yearbook of International Law 113, at 121.
124. M. Maduro, 'The Importance of Being Called a Constitution: Constitutional Authority and the Authority of Constitutionalism', (2005) 3(2-3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 316, at 336.
125. ibid, at 328 (emphasis added).
126. ibid, at 331.
127. Kumm, op cit n 76 supra, at 275.
128. But see C. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (Duncker & Humblot, 9th edn, 2003), reproducing the 1928 edition, 62-75 and 366-368
129. A. Greber, Die vorpositiven Grundlagen des Bundesstaates (Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2000), 173-207
130. O. Beaud, 'De nouveau sur l'État fédéral', (2006) 42 Droits 229.
131. See Ch. Schönberger, 'Die Europäische Union als Bund', (2004) 129(1) Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 81, at 109-113
132. Peters, op cit n 76 supra, at 234-239.
133. N. Walker, 'Post-Constituent Constitutionalism? The Case of the European Union', in N.Walker and M. Loughlin (eds), Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (Oxford University Press, 2007), 247, acknowledges that the usual understanding of constituent power is problematic when applied to a supranational polity. He does not contemplate the federal constitutional pact as a possibility, however, proposing instead a post-constituent constitutionalism that unveils the complexities of the notion of constituent power in the EU.
134. Case 59/75, Manghera [1976] ECR 102, para 21
135. Case 43/75, Defrenne II [1976] ECR 455, para 58. On this issue
136. see J.-V. Louis, 'Quelques considérations sur la révision des traités instituant les Communautés', (1980) 16(5-6) Cahiers de droit européen 553
137. B. de Witte, 'Treaty Revision in the European Union: Constitutional Change through International Law', (2004) XXXV Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 51.
138. E. Sieyes, Qu'est-ce que le Tiers état? (published in 1789; edition of R. Zapperi, Droz, 1970), at 180-204.
139. See, in this connection, C. Skach, 'We, the Peoples? Constitutionalizing the European Union', (2005) 43(1) Journal of Common Market Studies 149, at 165-167, according to whom comparative evidence suggests that 'there is no connection between a polyarchic constitution-making process and democracy'.
140. J. H. H. Weiler, 'Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision', (1995) 1(3) European Law Journal 219.
141. See, for example, M. Herdegen, 'Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court: Constitutional Restraints for an "Ever Closer Union"', (1994) 31 Common Market Law Review 235, at 249.
142. See K. Hailbronner, 'The European Union from the Perspective of the German Constitutional Court', (1994) 37 German Yearbook of International Law 93, at 93-94.
143. See the pleadings of these institutions in I. Winkelmann, Das Maastricht-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgericht vom 12. Oktober 1993 (Duncker & Humblot, 1994).
144. See the article by Grewe, op cit n 87 supra, at 227-229.
145. N. MacCormick, 'The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now', (1995) European Law Journal 259, at 265
146. his theory was first presented in 'Beyond the Sovereign State', (1993) 56(1) Modern Law Review 1.
147. In Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth (Oxford University Press, 1999), at 120-121, MacCormick has departed from 'radical pluralism', embracing 'pluralism under international law' - which would be "a kind of "monism" in Kelsen's sense', designed to 'diminish the risk of normative collisions'.
148. M. Maduro: 'Contrapunctual Law: Europe's Constitutional Pluralism in Action', in N. Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart, 2003), 501.
149. N. Walker, 'Late Sovereignty in the European Union', in Walker, ibid, 3, at 18.
150. See also N. Walker, 'The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism', (2002) 65(3) Modern Law Review 317.
151. See M. Kumm, 'Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe? Three Conceptions of the Relationship between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice', (1999) 36 CommonMarket Law Review 351.
152. See also his more recent article op cit n 76 supra.
153. This sort of proposals may have had some echo in national judicial practice. Renegotiation and constitutional amendment have also been mentioned by the 'commissaire du gouvernement' (M. Guyomar) of the French Conseil d'État as possible ways to avoid a French breach of EU law should the Conseil d'État conclude that a provision of Union law is in direct and unavoidable conflict with a provision of the French Constitution for which there is no functional equivalent in the primary law of the Union (see his 'Conclusions' in the case Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine et autres, No 287110, judgment of 8 February 2007, 27, n 34).
154. P. Kirchhof, 'The Legal Structure of the European Union as a Union of States', in von Bogdandy and Bast, op cit n 26 supra, 765, at 794.
155. See also P. Kirchhof, 'The Balance of Powers between National and European Institutions', (1999) 5(3) European Law Journal 225.
156. Mayer, op cit n 26 supra, at 323.
157. Weiler, op cit n 6 supra, at 322-323.
158. Ch. Schmid, 'From Pont d'Avignon to Ponte Vecchio: The Resolution of Constitutional Conflicts between the European Union and the Member States through the Principles of Public International Law', (1998) 18 Yearbook of European Law 415.
159. A. Verhoeven, The European Union in Search of a Democratic and Constitutional Theory (Kluwer, 2002), at 291-325.
160. See Komárek, op cit n 52 supra, at 36.
161. Mayer, op cit n 26 supra, at 306.
162. ibid, at 325.
163. This is clear already in Case 106/77, Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, para 24: 'refusing of its own motion to apply'.
164. See also Case C-184/89, Nimz [1991] ECR I-197, para 19
165. Joined Cases C-10/97 to C-22/97, IN CO GE [1998] ECR I-6307, paras 18-21.
166. Nettesheim, op cit n 32 supra, at 148-149.
167. Kumm, op cit n 76 supra, at 300.
168. Case C-36/02, Omega [2004] ECR I-9609.
169. See, for a similar critique, H. P. Ipsen, 'Zehn Glossen zum Maastricht-Urteil', (1994) 29(1) Europarecht 1, at 20.
170. D. M. Curtin, Postnational Democracy: The European Union in Search of a Political Philosophy (Kluwer, 1997), at 50-51.
171. As does, for example, N. W. Barber, 'Legal Pluralism and the European Union', (2006) 12(3) European Law Journal 306, at 328: 'we should welcome, rather than regret, inconsistency'.
172. M. Kumm and V. Ferreres Comella, 'The Primacy Clause of the Constitutional Treaty and the Future of Constitutional Conflict in the European Union', (2005) 3(2-3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 473, at 478-480.
173. Kumm, op cit n 76 supra, at 303.
174. Similarly, Mayer, op cit n 26 supra, at 324.
175. See G. C. Rodríguez Iglesias and A. Valle Gálvez, 'El Derecho comunitario y las relaciones entre el Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas, el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y los Tribunales Constitucionales nacionales', (1997) 1(2) Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo 329, at 373-376.
176. Maduro, op cit n 104 supra, at 524.
177. See J. Baquero Cruz, 'La procédure préjudicielle suffit-elle à garantir l'efficacité et l'uniformité du droit de l'Union européenne?', in L. Azoulai and L. Burgorgue-Larsen (eds), L'autorité de l'Union européenne (Bruylant, 2006), 241
178. 'De la cuestión prejudicial a la casación europea: Reflexiones sobre la eficacia y la uniformidad del Derecho de la Unión', (2005) 13 Revista Española de Derecho Europeo 35.
179. Sadurski, op cit n 49 supra, at 36, has argued that the resistance to EU law on the part of the constitutional courts of some of the new Member States 'can be well explained by their attempt to reinforce their domestic inter-institutional position, especially in the face of challenges and threats, real or imagined, from other governmental branches'.
180. Mayer, op cit n 26 supra, at 331.
181. I owe this point to Gil Carlos Rodríguez Iglesias.
182. See H. L. A. Hart in The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 1994), 89-90 and 100-110.
183. The 'internal point of view' is that of the persons that see themselves as members of a group and subject to its rules. The 'rule of recognition' defines a number of criteria that allow the members of a group to identify the legal rules to which they are subject.
184. The notions of 'vertebration' and 'invertebration' are borrowed from José Ortega y Gasset, España invertebrada, in Obras completas, Vol III (Fundación Ortega y Gasset-Taurus, 2005), first published in 1921, but used in a different sense.
185. See my article 'Europa invertebrada: Una conversación con Ortega', (2006) 300 Revista de Occidente 129.
186. On the compromise, see J. Baquero Cruz, 'The Luxembourg Compromise from a Legal Perspective: Constitutional Convention, Legal History or Political Myth?', in J.-M. Palayret, H. Wallace and P. Winand (eds), Visions, Votes and Vetoes: The Empty Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise Forty Years On (P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2006), 251.
187. See L. N. Lindberg, 'Integration as a Source of Stress on the European Community System', (1966) 20(2) International Organization 233.