National Borders and the Size of Nations

The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages

  Spolaore, Enrico ^a  

^a TUFTS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Break up; Compensations; Conflict; Formation; Income inequality; Literature; National borders; National size; Political economy; Size of nations

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925846809     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0043     Document Type: Chapter

References (64)

1. ADES, A., and GLAESER, E. 1999. Evidence on growth, increasing returns and the extent of the market. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114: 1025-45.
2. ALCAL¡, F., and CICCONE, A. 2003. Trade, the extent of the market and economic growth 1960-1996. Unpublished manuscript, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
3. ALESINA, A., and SPOLAORE, E. 1997. On the number and size of nations. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112: 1027-56.
4. Alesina, A., and Spolaore, E. 2003. The Size of Nations. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
5. ALESINA, A., and SPOLAORE, E. 2005. War, peace and the size of countries. Journal of Public Economics, 89: 1333-54.
6. ALESINA, A., and SPOLAORE, E. 2006. Conflict, defense spending, and the number of nations. European Economic Review, 50: 91-120.
7. ALESINA, A., and SPOLAORE, E. and WACZIARG, R. 2000. Economic integration and political disintegration. American Economic Review, 90: 1276-96.
8. ALESINA, A., and SPOLAORE, E. and WACZIARG, R. 2005. Trade, growth, and the size of countries. In The Handbook of Economic Growth, ed. P. Aghion and S. Durlauf. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
9. ALESINA, A., and WACZIARG, R. 1998. Openness, country size and the government. Journal of Public Economics, 69: 305-21.
10. ALESINA, A., and WACZIARG, R. 1999. Is Europe going too far? Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 51: 1-42.
11. ALESINA, A.,DERLEESCHAUWEN, A., EASTERLY, W., KURLAT, S., and WACZIARG, R. 2003. Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth, 8: 155-94.
12. Anderson, B. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.
13. Baldwin, R. E., and Venables, A. 1995. Regional economic integration. In The Handbook of International Economics, vol. iii, ed. G. Grossman and K. Rogoff. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
14. BARDHAN, P. 2002. Decentralization of governance and development. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16: 185-205.
15. BOLTON, P., and ROLAND, G. 1997. The breakups of nations: a political economy analysis. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112: 1057-89.
16. BOLTON, P., and ROLAND, G. and SPOLAORE, E. 1996. Economic theories of the break-up and integration of nations. European Economic Review, 40: 697-705.
17. BORDIGNON, M., and BRUSCO, S. 2001. Optimal secession rules. European Economic Review, 45: 1811-34.
18. Boulding, K. E. 1962. Conflict and Defense: A General Theory. New York: Harper.
19. BUCHANAN, J. M. 1965. An economic theory of clubs. Economica, 32: 1-14.
20. BUCHANAN, J. M., and FAITH, R. L. 1987. Secessions and the limits of taxation: towards a theory of internal exit. American Economic Review, 77: 1023-31.
21. CASELLA, A. 2001. The role of market size in the formation of jurisdictions. Review of Economic Studies, 68: 83-108.
22. CASELLA, A., and FEINSTEIN, J. S. 2002. Public goods in trade: on the formation of markets and political jurisdictions. International Economic Review, 43: 437-62.
23. DAGAN, N., and VOLIJ, O. 2000. Formation of nations in a welfare-state minded world. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2: 157-81.
24. Dahl, R. A., and Tufte, E. R. 1973. Size and Democracy. Stanford Calif.: Stanford University Press.
25. DE FIGUEIREDO, R., and WEINGAST, B. 2002. Self-enforcing federalism. Mimeo, Stanford University.
26. DRÈZE, J. H. 1993. Regions of Europe: a feasible status, to be discussed. Economic Policy, 8: 206-307.
27. EASTERLY, W., and LEVINE, R. 1997. Africa's growth tragedy: policies and ethnic divisions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111: 1203-50.
28. ELLINGSEN, T. 1998. Externalities and internalities: a model of political integration. Journal of Public Economics, 68: 251-68.
29. Findlay, R. 1996. Towards a model of territorial expansion and the limits of empires. In The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation, ed. M. Garfinkel and S. Skaperdas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
30. Frey, B., and Eichenberger, R. 1999. The New Democratic Federalism for Europe: Functional, Overlapping, and Competing Jurisdictions. London: Edward Elgar.
31. FRIEDMAN, D. 1977. A theory of the size and shape of nations. Journal of Political Economy, 85: 59-77.
32. Fujita, M., and Thisse, J. F. 2002. Economics of Agglomeration: Cities, Industrial Location, and Regional Growth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
33. GOYAL, S., and STAAL, K. 2004. The political economy of regionalism. European Economic Review, 48: 563-93.
34. GROSSMAN, H. I. 1991. A general equilibrium model of insurrections. American Economic Review, 81: 912-21.
35. GROSSMAN, H. I. and MENDOZA, J. 2004. Annexation or conquest? The building of the Roman Empire. Mimeo, Brown University.
36. HAIMANKO, O., LE BRETON, M., and WEBER, S. 2005. Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability. Journal of Public Economics, 89: 1277-303.
37. HIRSHLEIFER, J. 1989. Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: ratio versus difference models of relative success. Public Choice, 63: 101-12.
38. HIRSHLEIFER, J. 1991. The technology of conflict as an economic activity. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 81: 130-4.
39. HIRSHLEIFER, J. 1995a. Theorizing about conflict. In The Handbook of Defense Economics, ed. K. Hartley and T. Sandler. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
40. HIRSHLEIFER, J. 1995b. Anarchy and its breakdown. Journal of Political Economy, 103: 26-52.
41. Hobsbawn, E. 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
42. Inman, R. P., and Rubinfeld, D. L. 1997. The political economy of federalism. In Perspecitves on Public Choice, ed. D. C. Mueller. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
43. LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ DE SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A., and VISHNY, R. 1999. The quality of government. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15: 222-79.
44. LE BRETON, M., and WEBER, S. 2003. The art of making everybody happy: how to prevent a secession? IMF Staff Papers, 50: 403-35.
45. Murdoch, J. C. 1995. Military alliances: theory and empirics. In The Handbook of Defense Economics, ed. K. Hartley and T. Sandler. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
46. OATES, W. E. 1999. An essay on fiscal federalism. Journal of Economic Literature, 37: 1120-49.
47. OLSON, M., and ZECKHAUSER, R. 1966. An economic theory of alliances. Review of Economics and Statistics, 48: 266-79.
48. PANIZZA, U. 1999. On the determinants of fiscal centralization: theory and evidence. Journal of Public Economics, 74: 97-139.
49. PAULY, M. 1967. Clubs, commonality and the core: an integration of game theory and the theory of public goods. Economica, 34: 314-24.
50. PAULY, M. 1970. Cores and clubs. Public Choice, 9: 53-65.
51. Powell, R. 1999. In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
52. SCHMIDTCHEN, D. 1994. International contracting and territorial control: the boundary question. Journal of Institutional Economics, 150: 272-8.
53. Scotchmer, S. 2002. Local public goods and clubs. In The Handbook of Public Economics, vol. iv, ed. A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
54. SKAPERDAS, S. 1992. Cooperation, conflict and power in the absence of property rights. American Economic Review, 82: 720-39.
55. SPOLAORE, E. 1995. Economic integration, political borders and productivity. Prepared for the CEPR-Sapir conference on "Regional integration and economic growth," Tel Aviv University, Dec.
56. SPOLAORE, E. 2004. Economic integration, international conflict and political unions. Rivista di politica economica, Sept.-Oct.: 3-41.
57. SPOLAORE, E. and WACZIARG, R. 2005. Borders and growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 10: 331-8.
58. TIEBOUT, C. 1956. A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy, 64: 416-24.
59. Tilly, C. 1990. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.
60. THOMSON, E. A. 1974. Taxation and national defense. Journal of Political Economy, 82: 755-82.
61. Tullock, G. 1974. The Social Dilemma: The Economics of War and Revolution. Blacksburg, Va.: University Publications.
62. Viner, J. 1950. The Customs Union Issue. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
63. WITTMAN, D. 1991. Nations and states: mergers and acquisitions; dissolutions and divorce. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 81: 126-9.
64. WITTMAN, D. 2000. The wealth and size of nations. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6: 885-95.