Optimal secession rules

European Economic Review

Volumn 45, Issue 10, 2001, Pages 1811-1834

  Bordignon, Massimo ^a,b   Brusco, Sandro ^c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY IUAV OF VENICE   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITÀ CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE   (Italy)

^c DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION   (Spain)

^d UNIVERSITY OF CAGLIARI   (Italy)

Author keywords

Federalism; Secession

Indexed keywords

FEDERAL SYSTEM; POLITICAL SYSTEM; SECESSIONISM;

EID: 0035174065     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00095-7     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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