Re-thinking the ethics of dual-use research of concern on transmissible pathogens

Environment Systems and Decisions

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 129-132

  MacIntyre, C Raina ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

Author keywords

Dual use research of concern; DURC; Ethics; Genetic engineering; Infectious diseases; Influenza

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925496751     PISSN: 21945403     EISSN: 21945411     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10669-015-9534-9     Document Type: Article

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