Moratorium on research intended to create novel potential pandemic pathogens

mBio

Volumn 5, Issue 6, 2014, Pages

  Lipsitch, Marc ^a,c   Inglesby, Thomas V ^b  

^a HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH MEDICAL CENTER   (United States)

^c IMPERIAL COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EDITORIAL; FUNDING; GOVERNMENT; HUMAN; INFLUENZA; INFLUENZA VACCINATION; INFLUENZA VIRUS; MEDICAL RESEARCH; MIDDLE EAST RESPIRATORY SYNDROME CORONAVIRUS; NONHUMAN; PATHOGENESIS; PEER REVIEW; RISK ASSESSMENT; RISK BENEFIT ANALYSIS; SARS CORONAVIRUS; SIMULATION; UNITED STATES; VIRUS TRANSMISSION; FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT; GENETICS; HAZARDOUS WASTE; HEALTH CARE POLICY; INFLUENZA A VIRUS; ISOLATION AND PURIFICATION; OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES; OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH; PANDEMICS; PATHOGENICITY; PROCEDURES; TRENDS; VIROLOGY; VIRUS DISEASES;

BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH; CAPITAL FINANCING; CONTAINMENT OF BIOHAZARDS; HEALTH POLICY; INFLUENZA A VIRUS; MIDDLE EAST RESPIRATORY SYNDROME CORONAVIRUS; OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES; OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH; PANDEMICS; RISK ASSESSMENT; SARS VIRUS; UNITED STATES; VIRUS DISEASES;

EID: 84920895338     PISSN: 21612129     EISSN: 21507511     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1128/mBio.02366-14     Document Type: Editorial

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