Public economics and the household

Public Economics and the Household

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-290

  Apps, Patricia ^a   Rees, Ray ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925155229     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511626548     Document Type: Book

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