A consumer theory with comparative markets for work in marriage

Journal of Socio-Economics

Volumn 31, Issue 6, 2003, Pages 609-645

  Grossbard Shechtman, Shoshana ^a  

^a SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Competitive markets; Consumer theory; Intra household allocation; Marriage

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037222781     PISSN: 10535357     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1053-5357(02)00138-5     Document Type: Article

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