Chapter 2 A survey of theories of the family

Handbook of Population and Family Economics

Volumn 1, Issue PART A, 1997, Pages 21-79

  Bergstrom, Theodore C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956786710     PISSN: 1574003X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-003X(97)80019-0     Document Type: Review

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