A Cournot-Nash model of family decision making

Economic Journal

Volumn 111, Issue 474, 2001, Pages 722-748

  Chen, Zhiqi ^a   Woolley, Frances ^a  

^a CARLETON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; DECISION MAKING; ECONOMIC THEORY; HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE;

EID: 0034799879     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00657     Document Type: Article

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