Games in economic development

Games in Economic Development

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-294

  Wydick, Bruce ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO   (United States)

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EID: 84925143683     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511619663     Document Type: Book

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