For better or forever: Formal versus informal enforcement

Journal of Labor Economics

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 271-297

  Sobel, Joel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646065297     PISSN: 0734306X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/499973     Document Type: Review

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