Incentives, risk, and agency costs in the choice of contractual arrangements in agriculture

Review of Development Economics

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 460-477

  Agrawal, Pradeep ^a  

^a INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH   (India)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONTRACT FARMING; SHARECROPPING; TENURE SYSTEM; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0036785017     PISSN: 13636669     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9361.00167     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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21. Incentives and risk sharing in agriculture
22. Freedom and the Southern economy