Kleptocracy and revolutions

Oxford Economic Papers

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 267-283

  Grossman, Herschel I ^a  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC RELATIONS; POLITICAL CHANGE; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

EID: 0033032445     PISSN: 00307653     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oep/51.2.267     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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