The Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Ensuring Compliance?

The Oxford Handbook on The World Trade Organization

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages

  Sykes, Alan O'Neil ^a  

^a STANFORD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargain; Breach; Compliance; Concessions; Dispute settlement mechanism; Obligations; World trade organization

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925004825     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199586103.013.0026     Document Type: Chapter

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