Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 76, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 48-60

  Limão, Nuno ^a   Saggi, Kamal ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^b SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bonds; Dispute settlement; Monetary fines; Policy coordination; Tariffs; WTO

Indexed keywords

DISPUTE RESOLUTION; INTERNATIONAL TRADE; LEGISLATIVE IMPLEMENTATION; TARIFF STRUCTURE; TRADE AGREEMENT; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION;

EID: 48849107821     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2008.03.005     Document Type: Article

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