Eluding efficiency: Why do we not see more efficient breach at the WTO?

World Trade Review

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 629-642

  Pelc, Krzysztof J ^a  

^a MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052321914     PISSN: 14747456     EISSN: 14753138     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1474745610000352     Document Type: Article

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