The calculation and design of trade retaliation in context: What is the goal of suspending WTO obligations?

The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 34-72

  Pauwelyn, Joost ^a  

^a GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES   (Switzerland)

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EID: 84878950070     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511674594.003     Document Type: Chapter

References (35)

1. Thomas Sebastian, ‘The Law of Permissible WTO Retaliation’, Chapter 4, section 3(a)(i), below.
2. Simon Schropp, ‘The Equivalence Standard under Article 22.4, DSU: A “Tariffi c” Misunderstanding?’, Chapter 20, section A, below.
3. Håkan Nordström, ‘The Politics of Selecting Trade Retaliation in the EC: A View from the Floor’, Chapter 10, below.
4. As pointed out by Th omas Sebastian in his contribution to this volume, ‘The Law of Permissible WTO Retaliation’, Chapter 4, section 7.
5. Fritz Breuss, ‘A General Equilibrium Interpretation of some WTO Dispute Settlement Cases – Four EU–US Trade Confl icts’, Comment on Chapter 20, below.
6. Chad Bown and Michele Ruta, ‘Th e Economics of Permissible WTO Retaliation’, Chapter 6, below, whose entire study is predicated on pure reciprocity
7. Alan Sykes, ‘Optimal Sanctions in the WTO: Th e Case for Decoupling (and the Uneasy Case for the Status Quo)’, Chapter 16, below, who regards WTO dispute settlement as aimed at efficient breach with retaliation acting as a compensation device.
8. Simon Schropp, ‘The Equivalence Standard under Article 22.4, DSU: A “Tariffi c” Misunderstanding?’
9. Fritz Breuss, ‘A General Equilibrium Interpretation of some WTO Dispute Settlement Cases – Four EU–US Trade Confl icts’
10. William Davey, ‘Sanctions in the WTO: Problems and Solutions’
11. Reto Malacrida, ‘WTO Retaliatory Measures: the Case for Multilateral Regulation of the Domestic Decision-making Process’, Chapter 18, below, as well as the discussion in Th omas Sebastian, ‘Th e Law of Permissible WTO Retaliation’, Chapter 4, below.
12. Simon Schropp, ‘The Equivalence Standard under Article 22.4, DSU: A “Tariffi c” Misunderstanding?’, section A.
13. Håkan Nordström, ‘Th e Politics of Selecting Trade Retaliation in the EC: A View from the Floor’.
14. As proposed by William Davey, ‘Sanctions in the WTO: Problems and Solutions’, section 3.
15. Petros Mavroidis, ‘Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place’, 11 European Journal of International Law (2000), 763.
16. Steve Charnovitz, ‘Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions’, 95 American Journal of International Law (2001), 792.
17. Alan Sykes, ‘Optimal Sanctions in the WTO: Th e Case for Decoupling (and the Uneasy Case for the Status Quo)’.
18. Alan Sykes, ‘Optimal Sanctions in the WTO: The Case for Decoupling (and the Uneasy Case for the Status Quo)’.
19. Steve Charnovitz, ‘Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions’, 792.
20. Robert Hudec, Th e GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy (New York: Praeger,1975), 26–31
21. John Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT (Indianapolis, In: Bobbs- Merril, 1969), 169, note 21.
22. U nited Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, ‘Report of the Working Party 3 of Sub-committee G’, E/Conf.2/C.6/W.80, 30 January 1948, available at: http://trade.wtosh.com/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90200202.pdf (accessed on 15 January 2009).
23. The proposals were adopted without debate see United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, ‘Sub-committee on Chapter VIII, Notes of the 17th Meeting’, E/Conf.2/C.6/W.102, 16 February 1948, available at: http://trade.wtosh.com/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90200228.pdf (accessed on 15 January 2009).
24. United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, ‘Reports of Committees and Principal Subcommittees for the International Trade Organization’ (Geneva, 1948), 155, available at: www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90180096.pdf (accessed on 15 January 2009).
25. William Davey, ‘Sanctions in the WTO: Problems and Solutions’, section 1.
26. EC–Bananas (Ecuador), Decision by the arbitrators under Article 22.6, DSU, WT/DS27/ABR/ECU, para. 76 (underlining added).
27. Brazil–Aircraft, para. 3.58.
28. Canada–Export Credits and Guarantees, para. 3.107.
29. Canada–Export Credits and Guarantees, para. 3.121.
30. Joost Pauwelyn, Optimal Protection of International Law: Navigating between European Absolutism and American Voluntarism (Cambridge University Press, 2008).
31. A. Green and M. Trebilcock, ‘Enforcing WTO Obligations: What Can We Learn from Export Subsidies’, Journal of International Economic Law, 10 (2007), 653
32. R. Lawrence and N. Stankard, ‘Should Export Subsidies be Treated Diff erently?’, Mimeo, May 2005.
33. John H. Jackson, “Editorial Comment: International Law Status of WTO DS Reports: Obligation to Comply or Option to ‘Buy-Out’?,” American Journal of International Law, 98 (2004), 109–25.
34. John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2006), ch. 3, 62–76.
35. John H. Jackson, note 2, above, ch. 5.3, 147–51.