Economic analysis, moral philosophy, and public policy, second edition

Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy, Second Edition

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 1-342

  Hausman, Daniel M ^a   McPherson, Michael S ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b Spencer Foundation   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84924580661     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511754289     Document Type: Book

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