Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism

Ethics

Volumn 110, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 339-341

  Arneson, Richard J ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001322125     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233272     Document Type: Review

References (15)

1. Elizabeth S. Anderson, "What Is the Point of Equality?" Ethics 109 (1999): 287-337.
2. John E. Roemer, Theories of Distributive justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Erik Rakowski, Equal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981): 283-345; G. A. Cohen, "On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice," Ethics 99 (1989): 906-44; Richard Arneson, "Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare," Philosophical Studies 56 (1989): 77-93; and Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Is Wrong with Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
3. John E. Roemer, Theories of Distributive justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Erik Rakowski, Equal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981): 283-345; G. A. Cohen, "On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice," Ethics 99 (1989): 906-44; Richard Arneson, "Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare," Philosophical Studies 56 (1989): 77-93; and Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Is Wrong with Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
4. John E. Roemer, Theories of Distributive justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Erik Rakowski, Equal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981): 283-345; G. A. Cohen, "On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice," Ethics 99 (1989): 906-44; Richard Arneson, "Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare," Philosophical Studies 56 (1989): 77-93; and Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Is Wrong with Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
5. John E. Roemer, Theories of Distributive justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Erik Rakowski, Equal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981): 283-345; G. A. Cohen, "On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice," Ethics 99 (1989): 906-44; Richard Arneson, "Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare," Philosophical Studies 56 (1989): 77-93; and Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Is Wrong with Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
6. John E. Roemer, Theories of Distributive justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Erik Rakowski, Equal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981): 283-345; G. A. Cohen, "On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice," Ethics 99 (1989): 906-44; Richard Arneson, "Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare," Philosophical Studies 56 (1989): 77-93; and Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Is Wrong with Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
7. John E. Roemer, Theories of Distributive justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Erik Rakowski, Equal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981): 283-345; G. A. Cohen, "On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice," Ethics 99 (1989): 906-44; Richard Arneson, "Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare," Philosophical Studies 56 (1989): 77-93; and Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Is Wrong with Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
8. John E. Roemer, Theories of Distributive justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Erik Rakowski, Equal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981): 283-345; G. A. Cohen, "On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice," Ethics 99 (1989): 906-44; Richard Arneson, "Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare," Philosophical Studies 56 (1989): 77-93; and Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Is Wrong with Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
9. See also Richard Arneson, "Rawls, Responsibility, and Distributive Justice," in Justice, Political Liberalism, and Utilitarianism: Themes from Harsanyi and Rawls, ed. Maurice Salles and John A. Weymark (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in press).
10. On prioritarianism, see Derek Parfit, "Equality or Priority?" The Lindley Lecture (Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1995); also Dennis McKerlie, "Equality and Priority," Utilitas 6 (1994): 25-42; also Paul Weirich, "Utility Tempered with Equality," Nous 17 (1983): 423-39. On the variant responsibility-catering prioritarianism, see Richard Arneson, "Equality of Opportunity for Welfare Defended and Recanted," Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 7 (1999).
11. On prioritarianism, see Derek Parfit, "Equality or Priority?" The Lindley Lecture (Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1995); also Dennis McKerlie, "Equality and Priority," Utilitas 6 (1994): 25-42; also Paul Weirich, "Utility Tempered with Equality," Nous 17 (1983): 423-39. On the variant responsibility-catering prioritarianism, see Richard Arneson, "Equality of Opportunity for Welfare Defended and Recanted," Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 7 (1999).
12. On prioritarianism, see Derek Parfit, "Equality or Priority?" The Lindley Lecture (Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1995); also Dennis McKerlie, "Equality and Priority," Utilitas 6 (1994): 25-42; also Paul Weirich, "Utility Tempered with Equality," Nous 17 (1983): 423-39. On the variant responsibility-catering prioritarianism, see Richard Arneson, "Equality of Opportunity for Welfare Defended and Recanted," Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 7 (1999).
13. On prioritarianism, see Derek Parfit, "Equality or Priority?" The Lindley Lecture (Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1995); also Dennis McKerlie, "Equality and Priority," Utilitas 6 (1994): 25-42; also Paul Weirich, "Utility Tempered with Equality," Nous 17 (1983): 423-39. On the variant responsibility-catering prioritarianism, see Richard Arneson, "Equality of Opportunity for Welfare Defended and Recanted," Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 7 (1999).
14. A further complication should be noted. Claims (1) and (2) are compatible with (3): It is morally bad if some are as well off as others through no merit of their own. Moreover, (1) through (3) are compatible with the denial of a straight assertion of equality, (4): It is morally bad if some are worse off than others. What Anderson calls "luck egalitarianism" might then be interpreted as a principle of moral meritocracy along the lines of (5): It is morally desirable that each person be exactly as well off or badly off as she deserves on the basis of her moral merit. So far as I can see, my responses to Anderson's criticisms of luck egalitarianism and to her grounds for endorsing the rival "democratic equality" view are not affected by ambiguity in her characterization of luck egalitarianism.
15. Anderson, p. 291. Leximin holds that we ought, as a first priority, maximally to improve the condition of the worst-off individual, then as a second priority, maximally to improve the condition of the second-worst-off, and so on up to the best-off. Prioritarianism holds that we ought to maximize a weighted sum of benefit that gives extra weight to obtaining a benefit for a person, the worse off she is prior to receipt of the benefit. This will imply giving priority to helping the worse off. Since prioritarianism welcomes chance events that increase people's well-being, it is not, strictly speaking, a member of the luck egalitarian family of views, just a close cousin. Prioritarianism prefers the outcome in which a random meteor shower confers benefits costlessly on some already advantaged people to the status quo ante in which well-being is less for some people and better for none, but more equally divided. Leximin, an extreme version of prioritarianism, dictates the same preference ordering over these two alternatives.