Measuring Legislative Preferences

The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages

  McCarty, Nolan ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Congress; Decision making; Ideal point estimation; Legislature; Preferences; Roll call voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 84924300068     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199559947.003.0004     Document Type: Chapter

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